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Introduction
Norms are understood as an important driver of human behavior. This has been acknowledged by economists not least since the seminal work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) . In the last decade, gender norms have received increased interest and economists have been striving to understand the extent to which they impact economic agents' behavior (see, e.g., Fernández et al., 2004; Fortin, 2005; Alesina et al., 2013; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Teso, 2018) . However, the empirical identification of norms remains a challenge.
We show that a comparison of surveyed and actual outcomes offers the potential to shed light on norms. If survey responses are affected by norms, this results in systematic deviation between surveyed and actual outcomes. Since there is little incentive to systematically misreport in surveys other than norms, such deviations are a promising and novel way to quantify norms.
1 In applying this strategy, we document that women systematically underreport their income in order not to outearn their partner. We use this strategy and revisit the findings in recent work by Bertrand et al. (2015) . They study women's income as a share of total couple income. They document that the distribution of female income shares features a distinct discontinuity just above 50 percent, the point after which a woman would outearn her partner. The peculiar bunching below this unwritten margin cannot be explained by standard models of the marriage market. Bertrand et al. (2015) argue that it is rather an expression of traditional gender norms prescribing that women must not earn more than their partner. Two mechanisms, couple formation complying with this norm and women actively adapting their labor income in order not to outearn their partner have so far been the primary explanations for this discontinuity. We concur that the discontinuity and the mass point at 50 percent of relative income are driven by gender identity, and show that strategic misreporting is essential in explaining the discontinuity in female income shares in survey data.
Empirical evidence building on the results of Bertrand et al. (2015) is in line with this result, with more distinct discontinuities found in studies using survey data. Wieber and Holst (2015) , e.g., find a strong discontinuity in the relative income distribution in Germany of roughly 60 percent, i.e., the mass just above the threshold is 60 percent lower than below. Studies drawing on administrative data, on the other hand, rather conclude that the discontinuity is less distinct (Eriksson and Stenberg (2015) , 22.5 percent in Sweden; Binder and Lam (2018) , 12.4 percent in the US). However, other potential explanations for these differences might lie in the institutional framework of a country. Collective agreements, minimum wages, or a progressive income tax schedule with individual taxation may amplify incentives for couples to bunch at exactly fifty percent, which is reflected in a large spike at this point of the distribution. Binder and Lam (2018) , Eriksson and Sten-berg (2015) , and Zinovyeva and Tverdostup (2018) indicate that the spike at the point where spouses earn the exact same income consists mainly of couples working in the same sector or for the same employer. We argue that an additional factor is whether the used data is subject to reporting biases. Descriptive evidence for the US is also in line with the hypothesis that misreporting might be an important factor in explaining the differences, finding that women's deviation between surveyed and actual incomes is higher in couples where the woman earns more than her husband than in couples where the woman earns less than her husband (Murray-Close and Heggeness, 2018) .
We draw on data for Switzerland, which offers the opportunity to compare reported and administrative incomes for the interviewed person. The survey also includes information on the reported income of a respondent's partner, which is provided by the surveyed individual. In a first step, we show that there is a discontinuity in the distribution of reported relative incomes in Swiss survey data. We find that, irrespective of the gender of the respondent, there is a sharp drop of about 70 percent at the threshold where a woman would outearn her partner. In a second step, we evaluate whether some of the discontinuity is due to systematic income misreporting around the threshold value. Even though there is no economic incentive to systematically misreport one's income at this margin, we find that women seem to underreport their income to fall just below the threshold of 50 percent. We bolster our finding that misreporting around the threshold is indeed related to gender norms using four different strategies: We use the sex composition of children, within couple age difference, inherited norms of migrants, and gender norms in the municipality of residence as proxies to identify groups who we suspect to hold more traditional gender norms. Our results show that women in groups with more traditional gender norms underreport their incomes to a larger extent than women with more liberal gender norms. For men, misreporting behavior around the margin is less conclusive.
Simulating the distribution of relative incomes by correcting for misreporting of own incomes, we find that the discontinuity vanishes and thus that misreporting can account for the bunching mass just below the threshold. An in-depth analysis of male responses strongly suggests that males follow mixed strategies to circumvent a norm violation, compared to females who follow a clear strategy of misreporting at the margin. Men either underreport the income of their partner such that she earns substantially less, they misreport her income at the margin, or they overreport their own income at the margin.
We document that the discontinuity in the distribution of females' relative incomes in survey data is indeed driven by gender norms materializing in systematic income misreporting. The question whether misreporting of incomes is equally relevant in other countries and different institutional settings is up for future research. However, our evidence clearly reveals that potential survey bias has to be considered when working with survey items that are prone to distortions through social norms. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the combination of survey and administrative data may be a novel approach to measuring norms.
2 Data
Our analysis draws on the largest Swiss labor market survey (Schweizerische Arbeitskräftererhebung, SAKE), which is enriched with information from different social insurance registers. This combined data set is called social security and labour market (SESAM). The survey is based on telephone interviews where the respondent within a household is randomly chosen.
Our main analysis is based on the survey years 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, and 2015 . In these years, the special questionnaire "Social Security", including questions about partner income, was administered in addition to the basic questionnaire. Based on this data, we can determine the relative income share of women, and in addition know the surveyed individual's actual labor income. Our main sample consists of couples with Swiss citizenship or permanent residence permit, and where both partners are in paid employment.
2 Survey income can be stated as either hourly, monthly, or yearly gross or net income. The category most commonly chosen is monthly gross income, picked by 36% of individuals. In order to avoid biases from approximations, we focus on individuals who report both their own as well as their partner's income as monthly gross or net income. We restrict the sample to individuals employed in the twelve months prior to the interview. We exclude all individuals who work shift since for them, some part of their income is varying from month to month. We also exclude couples where any one partner is self-employed as administrative income may be distributed between partners such that taxes are minimized. We further exclude all same sex couples and proxy interviews, as well as couples where one or both partners are above the retirement age of 65. Finally, we exclude individuals for whom the difference between surveyed and administrative income exceeds the 90 th percentile or falls below the 10 th percentile. This leaves us with a sample of 9,316 couples for the analysis. The main variables of interest are:
• Administrative income: Measures an individual's actual earnings as recorded in social insurance registers. The variable reports total monthly gross income from employment in the month of the interview.
• Survey income: Measures the reported income of the surveyed individual and of their partner, stated by the surveyed individual.
3
• Relative income: Measures the relative income share of women in the household of the respondent based on surveyed income. We define it as [Survey income woman/(Survey income man + Survey income woman)] × 100.
2 Foreigners with temporary residence permit are exposed to a special tax scheme, which among other things entails taxation at source. They might thus report their income differently (see, e.g., Schmidheiny and Slotwinski, 2018) .
3 The original questions are displayed in Appendix A.3.
• Income deviation: Captures an individual's deviation of their own income and is defined as [(Administrative income − Survey income)/Administrative income] × 100.
Results
Our empirical results are presented in four steps: In a first step, we test for a discontinuity in the distribution of females' relative incomes. In a second step, we analyze whether there is systematic misreporting of individuals' incomes at the margin where a woman would outearn her partner. In a third step, we reinforce the finding that systematic misreporting around the threshold where a woman would outearn her partner is linked to traditional gender norms. In a last step, we assess the extent to which the observed discontinuity can be explained by systematic misreporting around the threshold and whether systematic misreporting leads to biases in the distribution of relative incomes more generally.
Distribution of surveyed female relative income
To test for a discontinuity in the density of surveyed relative income shares at the 50 percent threshold, we apply the empirical likelihood-based test by Otsu et al. (2013) , which has several advantages over the previously proposed approach by McCrary (2008) .
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In a nutshell, it estimates the discontinuity in separate local (linear) likelihood density estimates (LLD) to both sides of the threshold. Consistently, for graphical evidence, we plot two LLD estimates to both sides of the threshold of a relative income of women of 50 percent. The overall discontinuity amounts to about 4 percentage points. The relative size of the discontinuity is about 4. In other words, the point estimate just below the threshold is about 4 times as high as the estimate just above the threshold. Or to put it differently, the mass drops by about 70 percent at the threshold.
7 As this bunching is a local phenomenon, the relative size becomes even larger, about 8 or 88 percent, if we use half the bandwidth, i.e., 3.5 percent (see Table A .2 in Appendix A.2).
4 Please see Otsu et al. (2013) for more details about the approach. 5 More precisely we use the local likelihood implementation (locfit) in the Chronux software package for Matlab (Bokil et al., 2010) to fit LLDs to our data. 6 We choose the bandwidth to be 7 percent, as this is the optimal bandwidth for the later RDD estimates, and we prefer to base the evidence on the same sample. The optimal bandwidth following McCrary (2008) would be 12.89 and that proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2018) would be 5 percent. 
Income misreporting
In this section, we investigate whether some part of the established discontinuity arises as a consequence of systematic misreporting in surveys. If misreporting reflects gender norms, we should observe women underreporting their own or overreporting their partner's wage around the 50 percent threshold of women's relative incomes. If a woman earning slightly more than her partner underreports her income such that it is below her partner's, this will result in two changes: First, the percentage difference between administrative and reported income will increase in absolute terms. Second, since based on surveyed incomes, the woman now earns less than her partner, the couple will find themselves below 50 percent in the distribution of relative income shares. A man whose partner earns just more and who wants to conform with the social norm that a woman should earn less would, respectively, overreport his income. Such behavior would result in a strong selection of individuals around the threshold, where those conforming with the norm are placed just below and those not conforming above the 50 percent margin. We observe both actual and reported incomes of the surveyed individual and can test the hypothesis that income misreporting is related to the discontinuity. However, we only observe if individuals misreport their own wages, and not if they misreport their partner's wage. If traditional gender norms are reflected in the reporting of the partner's income, this would lead to a shift in relative income to below 50 percent, with no change in misreporting. As we do not observe the partner's actual income, this shift is indistinguishable from a real response to us. In the last section, we propose a strategy that might still help to learn about the manipulation of partner earnings.
The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the graphical representation of income misreporting for women and men in a RDD graph, delineating two local linear smooths from both sides of the threshold. Misreporting is calculated as the deviation between administrative and surveyed incomes, corrected for the overall average deviation, as well as for the mode of reporting (gross, net).
8 For the remainder of the paper, the terms misreporting, underreporting, or overreporting refer to a divergence from the average deviation between actual and reported incomes. Due to the definition of misreporting, positive values indicate underreporting and negative ones overreporting. The graphs reveal visually that there is a sharp drop in misreporting of women just at 50 percent. In other words, women who would otherwise outearn their partners are more likely to underreport their own income, shifting it to equal or fall slightly below the income of their partner. For men, we see no clear pattern in misreporting around the threshold. While the RDD nicely visualizes the data, it might not be the right strategy to investigate the particular selection, as it essentially compares the selection of individuals to the left with the selection to the right. The relevant comparison, however, is how misreporting of the selection of individuals around the threshold differs from income misreporting of individuals outside this narrow window. We calculate this divergence using OLS and dummying out the six percentiles around the margin with the reference category being individuals with a relative income share between 30 percent and 70 percent outside the interval between 47 percent and 53 percent, as presented in Equation 1.
(1) ∆y i is the percentage difference between administrative and survey income. Variables d48 to d53 indicate whether the reported income share earned by the woman in the couple falls into one of the six percentiles around the threshold, where d48 is set to one if relative income is larger than 47 percent and smaller or equal to 48 percent and zero otherwise. The same applies for the remaining indicator variables. Coefficient estimate α shows the average difference between administrative and survey incomes of all couples where the income share earned by women lies between 30 percent and 70 percent and ρ g indicates whether income is reported as net. The estimates of δ k measure misreporting for couples with relative incomes around the threshold of 50 percent. The OLS estimates for women and men are presented in the second panel of Figure 2 . They confirm what the RDD graphs suggest: Women in the percentile just below 50 percent underreport their income by about 1.03 percentage points more than the average woman. This estimate is statistically significant and also significantly different from the (3) and (6) of Table A .3. The graphs in the second panel show OLS estimates of individuals' income misreporting, i.e., the deviation from the average between actual and stated income, for the three percentiles below and above 50 percent of household income earned by women. The corresponding estimates can be found in row (1) estimate for the group just above 50 percent, with a difference between both of 2.71 percentage points. This approximately corresponds to the RDD estimate. The results suggest that many women in the 50 th percentile of the distribution of reported income shares would outearn their partner based on actual incomes, but shift their incomes below those of their partner in surveys to comply with traditional gender norms. The observation that women who stay just above the threshold show systematically lower misreporting is reasonable given that this represents a selection of women not conforming to traditional gender norms. It is conceivable that these women are more conscious about their income 8 and that their reporting is therefore closer to their actual earnings. Moving further below the threshold, the estimates become insignificant. This is in line with the argument that traditional gender norms state that a woman should not outearn her partner. Once this is achieved, there is no reason to further understate the income. 9 The OLS results confirm that there is no systematic misreporting of their own income by men around the threshold.
Norms and income misreporting
In this section, we provide additional support for the conclusion that misreporting is driven by gender norms. We use four proxies for gender norms to test whether groups which we would expect to be more traditional indeed misreport to a larger extent. We use gender composition of children, age differentials within a couple, the cultural background of immigrants, and regional variation in gender norms as measured by the share of full-time working women in the municipality of residence as proxies to validate that the documented income misreporting is indeed related to traditional gender norms. We estimate an interaction model, as outlined in equation 2, including all individuals for whom we are able to identify the relevant norm proxy.
In addition to the variables included in equation 1, we allow average misreporting to differ for the more traditional group by adding a group indicator traditional i . To capture deviations from average misreporting for this group, we include a full set of interaction terms for the percentile dummies around the threshold in relative incomes. The γ k coefficients allow us to determine whether strategic misreporting in order to fall below the 50 percent margin is more pronounced for individuals whom we expect to hold more traditional gender norms.
Gender norms proxied by the sex composition of children
As a first test, we turn to the sex composition of children as a proxy for parents' gender norms and examine how this is related to misreporting around the threshold. Social scientists have long demonstrated that parents of only daughters are more likely to be in favor of public policies supporting gender equity than parents of only sons or of both sons and daughters (see e.g., Warner 1991 , Warner and Steel 1999 , Washington 2008 . Applying this argument to our setting, we expect that parents with only daughters have more liberal gender norms than parents with both sons and daughters or only sons. Furthermore, child gender can be considered exogenous in the current setting. We restrict our sample to parents and define parents who only have daughters as the reference group which parents with either only sons or with children of both genders are compared to.
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As indicated in the first panel of Figure 3 , mothers of only daughters do not misreport their income, whereas mothers of only sons or of sons and daughters underreport their income. This finding is in line with previous literature and gives further indication that misreporting around the 50 percent threshold is a good measure of the strength of gender norms. For fathers, there is no difference in misreporting around the threshold.
Gender norms proxied by the within couple age difference
The second strategy is based on within couple age differences. Following Folke and Rickne (2016) , we use the within couple age difference as a proxy of an individual's gender norms when entering the relationship. Couples where the man is older than the woman are on average more compliant with traditional gender norms. In our sample, men are at the median two years older than their partner. We divide the sample at the median and define couples where the man is more than two years older than the woman as being more traditional when it comes to gender norms.
The results of the interaction model are shown in the second panel of Figure 3 . They confirm the results of the previous analysis: Women in couples where the man is more than two years older underreport their income while there is no strategic misreporting of incomes by women in less traditional couples. Again, there is no clear pattern for men.
Gender norms proxied by individuals' inherited norms
In a third step, we test whether systematic income misreporting around the threshold is linked to inherited cultural norms in the origin countries of migrants. We approximate cultural norms by responses to relevant questions in the World Value Survey (WVS).
We exploit the fact that Switzerland has a comparatively high share of immigrants and apply the epidemiological approach suggested in Fernández and Fogli (2009) . We approximate an individual's norms by gender norms in the country of their ancestry. The basic idea is that individuals take part of the culture (through socialization) with them when emigrating. These norms are to some extent also transmitted intergenerationally. As these individuals live and partly grow up in the same country and institutional setting, any difference in their behavior should emerge through these transmitted gender norms. Traditional gender norms are proxied by average agreement of all employed women with the statement "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women" at the country level, as measured in the WVS. Splitting countries at the sample median, we define two types of origin countries: Countries where average agreement is lower, which we would expect to hold less traditional gender norms, and countries where agreement is higher, which we expect to hold more traditional gender norms.
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The results presented in panel 3 of Figure 3 show that women with origins in more gender equal countries do not misreport their income around the threshold, while women from more unequal countries in terms of gender norms do. This again supports the proposition that women's misreporting is related to traditional gender norms. For men, however, we again do not see any strategic misreporting around the threshold.
Gender norms proxied by municipality characteristics
In a last step, we test whether systematic income misreporting around the threshold is linked to an individual's environment. We consider norms in the municipality of residence and explore whether living in more traditional municipalities is related to misreporting. As shown by Lalive and Stutzer (2010) , individual attitudes towards appropriate wages of women are strongly affected by gender norms in the municipality of residence. We measure a municipality's norms by average female full-time employment, defining municipalities with a full-time share below the sample median (25.8 percent) as traditional.
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As the fourth panel in Figure 3 shows, we find that there is no significant difference in misreporting of women by municipality type. On the other hand, men's income reporting seems to be related to the norms prevailing in the municipality of residence: Men living in an environment where women work to a lesser extent seem to hold more traditional gender norms themselves. They overreport their own income, which shifts their income just above their partner's. This difference might either measure the effect of living in such a municipality or capture a specific selection of individuals choosing to live in more traditional municipalities.
The findings of the four sub-analyses are consistent with gender norms as the primary driver of misreporting around the threshold where the woman and the man in a couple have equal earnings. Especially misreporting of women is closely aligned with more traditional gender norms, with only mothers of just daughters, women choosing a partner that is approximately the same age or younger, and women with origins in more gender equal countries not strategically underreporting their incomes in order not to outearn their partner. For men, the picture is less conclusive. While overall they do not manipulate their own earnings, we find overreporting for those residing in traditional municipalities. Tables A.4 and A.6, as well as Tables A.5 and A.7, in Appendix A.2.
Discussion
This section assesses the extent to which the documented systematic misreporting can account for the discontinuity in the distribution of women's income shares in our sample and provides a more in depth discussion of men's income reporting behavior.
Distribution controlling for misreporting
We apply a back of the envelope simulation to shed light on the extent to which misreporting drives the discontinuity found. We simulate the corrected distribution of women's relative incomes by adding, respectively subtracting, misreporting exceeding the average deviation of surveyed to actual incomes for each individual in the sample. 13 We then recalculate females' relative income shares using this corrected income and re-estimate the distribution of women's relative incomes. This allows us to approximate the distribution were there no systematic differences in misreporting of respondents' income across the distribution of income shares. The simulated density accounts for misreporting of one's own income around the threshold. It does not account for misreporting of the partner's income. The simulated density, visualized in Figure A. 3 (a), shows that there is considerable reshuffling of mass around the threshold in the sample of female respondents, with the mass above growing. While the relative size of the discontinuity estimate before was about 4, in the corrected data it is only about 1.16 and no longer significant (row (4) in Table A .1 in Appendix A.2). This suggests that in the sample at hand, norm driven misreporting at the margin can account for the observed spike just below 50 percent in the female sample. Comparing this to the changes in the distribution of relative incomes reported by men presented in Figure A .3 (b), we find that there is less change overall. What we observe is a mass shift to the right just around the threshold, which cancels the discontinuity and the spike at exactly 50 percent (see Table A .1 row 5 in Appendix A.2).
The finding that the discontinuity is completely explained by misreporting might, however, not be fully applicable to other countries. In Switzerland there are, for instance, no particular tradition of collective wage agreements applying to whole sectors and no general minimum wage. This makes it less likely for couples to earn exactly the same income, even if working in the same sector. Additionally, married couples are taxed jointly and there is no tax incentive to equalize earnings. Lastly, in contrast to all other studies we are aware of, we do not restrict our sample to married couples only but include cohabitating couples into our analysis. They probably exhibit a lower relationship tenure than married couples on average, making it less likely that they have fully completed the 13 Average deviations are 12 percent if a women reports her income as gross and 21 percent if she reports as net. The corresponding values for the male sample are 11 percent and 18 percent respectively. 13 wage adjustment process.
14 There are thus good reasons to expect that some spike due to real labor market responses would persist in different institutional settings.
Income misreporting by men
As documented above, we do not observe the same overall stable pattern in income misreporting around the threshold by men as we see by women. In fact, men overall do not seem to systematically misreport their income in order to earn slightly more than their partner, the exception being men who live in a municipality with a below median share of female full-time workers. While this can account for the spike in the distribution just below the threshold, as becomes evident in the section above, the moved mass is considerably lower. At the same time, we observe that the shape of the overall relative income distribution reported by men differs strongly from the one reported by women. This indicates that men follow multiple strategies in order to circumvent norm violation. Figure 4 presents a direct comparison of the distribution of relative incomes when these are reported by men vs. when incomes are reported by women. It reveals that the fraction of women earning less than 25 percent of household incomes is much higher when incomes are reported by men than when they are reported by women. Furthermore, the distribution reported by women is higher between 40 and 65 percent of women's income shares. In the survey, however, the respondent within a household is chosen randomly. Consequently, the true distribution should be the same irrespective of the respondent's gender. The fact that they differ suggests that one or both groups misreport their own or their partner's income, which positions them in different regions of the distribution. Based on the results for women, whose strategy of misreporting seems to be to misreport marginally around the threshold, it is to be expected that their distribution is closer to the actual one as we move away from the threshold. This suggests that the excess mass at the lower tail of the distribution reported by men is due to men underreporting their partner's income to the extent that pushes them to not only slightly below the threshold, but much further down in the distribution. This shift would not be visible in the analyses above, where we concentrate on the percentiles just around the threshold. It should, however, be reflected in the level of female wages reported by men across relative incomes when compared to wages reported by women with a similar relative income share, as shown in Figure 5 . To calculate average incomes for each percentile of the distribution, we first regress log incomes on an indicator net, set to one if incomes are reported as net, and calculate residual incomes in order to correct for the percentage difference brought about by the response mode. We then calculated average reported own income, reported partner income, and actual incomes for each percentile of the distribution of relative incomes.
by women for the same percentile. 16 The pattern suggests that men place the couple below the 40 th percentile of the distribution of relative incomes, even though they would lie somewhere else in terms of actual wages. The fact that for this group, the reported earnings of a woman to achieve an income share of say 20 percent is lower than in the women's reported distribution points to the conclusion that men, at this point of the distribution, also have lower incomes than the partners of women who are placed at the same point of the distribution based on their own reporting. The closer to the 50 percent threshold, the more incomes reported by men and women converge, while reported wages diverge from actual wages. Knowing from the analysis above that women at this point of the distribution systematically underreport their incomes, the convergence suggests that men are underreporting the incomes of their partners here, too. Men thus, to a large extent, manipulate the reported income of their partner instead of their own earnings, and this manipulation is not concentrated around the threshold. When considering the level of men's earnings reported by men vs. women presented in Figure 5 (b), we observe that the incomes reported by men and women are more in line with each other across the distribution, while both lie below the actual earnings' levels. It is only at the lower tail that this difference is noisy.
Overall the evidence shows that women follow a straight forward and rather homogeneous strategy to circumvent norm violation, while men follow mixed strategies, which are to a large extent driven by misreporting of their partner's income.
Conclusion
We show that individuals' survey responses are prone to the influence of social norms. A comparison of surveyed and actual outcomes allows us to identify the latter. Drawing on prior work by Bertrand et al. (2015) , we introduce misreporting in survey data as an additional mechanism behind the discontinuity in relative income shares of women at the point where the woman would outearn her partner.
Based on Swiss survey data combined with administrative information on respondents' incomes, we document that bunching below the threshold where a woman outearns her partner is related to strategic misreporting in survey data in order to conform with traditional gender norms. The impact of gender norms is potentially not only confined to survey responses, but also to the perspective which individuals take on in their self-perception and social interactions. However, the discontinuity in the share women contribute to couple income is not necessarily driven by actual economic choices.
From a broader perspective, our evidence contributes to the knowledge on the reliability of survey information on issues that involve strong social norms.
Data Statement
The confidential individual-level data (SESAM) were obtained under contract Nr. 180262 from the Swiss Statistical Office. The data from the Swiss Structural Survey (Strukturerhebung) were obtained under contract Nr. 170334. Access is granted for scientific research projects after review of a detailed application.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Definition of an individual's ancestry
In order to gain a comprehensive picture of individuals' migration background, we exploit information on the respondents' nationality and their parents' country of birth.Information on the individuals' nationality or their second nationality if they hold dual citizenship (Swiss and any foreign country) have been part of the regular SAKE survey since 2003, which means this information is available for all years we use for the analysis except for 2002. The fact that the SAKE survey was a rotating panel before 2010, with individuals being surveyed in five consecutive years, allows us to link the 2002 and 2003 surveys in order to retrieve an individual's nationality. Applying these strategies, we have a sample of 2,837 individuals with information on migratory background. The information on an individual's background is supplemented with data on norms persisting in their country of ancestry, as reflected in the World Value Surveys.
18 We use average approval rates of full-time or part-time employed women with the statement "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women" as a measure of gender norms. If a person has a nationality besides Swiss, we use approval rates in the country of their origin. If this information is not available or if an individual has no nationality other than Swiss, we use approval rates in the mother's country of birth as a proxy for norms, and if this is not available, we proxy norms through average approval rates in the father's country of birth. Norms for the countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro and Central Serbia (Country names defined by the BFS (https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/grundlagen/stgb.assetdetail.6166613.html) are proxied by values for Serbia. Based on this information, we generate a binary variable indicating whether an individual's country of origin shows average approval rates above or equal to the sample median or below the sample median. The within sample median is set by Germany (represents 18 percent of the sample) where 12 percent of surveyed women who work either full-or part-time agree with the statement that "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." The largest fraction of individuals with a background in a country with average approval below the median are from Italy (36 percent) and the largest fraction of individuals from a country with average approval above the median having migration background in countries with norms proxied by Serbia (21 percent). This results in two types of origin countries:
• Equal countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Dominican Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United States 
A.2 Tables & Figures Discontinuity in density estimates
In the following two tables with density discontinuity estimates, c refers to the used threshold (the lowest value of relative incomes exceeding 50 percent in order to only fit the density between realized values), h refers to the bandwidth,f l reports the fit of the density coming from the left andf r coming from the right respectively,θ is the estimate of the discontinuity,lr is the value of the local likelihood ratio statistic under the null 19 , andf l /f r measures the relative size of the discontinuity. Notes: Rows (1) to (3) present local likelihood ratio results for the discontinuity in the distribution of females' relative income. Row (4) and (5) presents the local likelihood ratio result for the discontinuity in the distribution of individuals' simulated relative incomes. N stands for the number of observations with regard to the observations available for estimating the whole density in the sample. Notes: Rows (1) to (3) present local likelihood ratio results for the discontinuity in the distribution of females' relative income. Row (4) and (5) presents the local likelihood ratio result for the discontinuity in the distribution of individuals' simulated relative incomes. N stands for the number of observations with regard to the observations available for estimating the whole density in the sample. Overall LLD fit of the income share earned by a woman in the couple separately for surveyed men and women. The solid line represents the LLD fit on both sides of the threshold using a bandwidth of 7 percent. The shaded area represents the histogram of the underlying data in 1 percent bins. The corresponding density discontinuity estimates can be found in rows (2) and (3) (2008) proposes a binsize of 0.299 and a bandwidth of 12.89. It renders a point estimate of log difference in height of 0.467 with a p-value of 0.057. The manipulation test provided in the rddensity package in stata (Cattaneo et al., 2018) proposes an optimal bandwidth of 5 percent and also indicates a clear discontinuity with p-values<0.01. Notes: Local linear sharp regression discontinuity estimates for three bandwidths. A bandwidth of seven corresponds to the optimal bandwidth. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. They are estimated using the rdrobust package for stata (Calonico et al., 2017) . N lef t stands for the number of observations available to the left of the threshold, N right for the number of observations available to the right of the threshold. N ef f. lef t and N ef f. right refer to the number of observations used to estimate the RDD estimate. Notes: OLS estimates of misreporting around the 50 percent margin, within the female sample and for different subsamples. The estimates of indicator variables around the threshold of 50 percent indicate the deviation from the average difference between actual and stated income for the three percentiles below and above 50 percent of household income earned by women. The interaction terms indicate the difference in misreporting for the groups holding more traditional gender norms. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Notes: OLS estimates and the linear combinations of the interactions of misreporting around the 50 percent margin, within the female sample and for different subsamples. The estimates of indicator variables around the threshold of 50 percent indicate the deviation from the average difference between actual and stated income for the three percentiles below and above 50 percent of household income earned by women and for the groups holding more liberal or more traditional gender norms respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Notes: OLS estimates of misreporting around the 50 percent margin, within the male sample and for different subsamples. The estimates of indicator variables around the threshold of 50 percent indicate the deviation from the average difference between actual and stated income for the three percentiles below and above 50 percent of household income earned by women. The interaction terms indicate the difference in misreporting for the groups holding more traditional gender norms. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Notes: OLS estimates and the linear combinations of the interactions of misreporting around the 50 percent margin, within the male sample and for different subsamples. The estimates of indicator variables around the threshold of 50 percent indicate the deviation from the average difference between actual and stated income for the three percentiles below and above 50 percent of household income earned by women and for the groups holding more liberal or more traditional gender norms respectively. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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